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Alternatives to Appropriation Law
FRANK

J.

TRELEASE*

In recent years many water laws throughout the world
have been subjected to review and reconsideration. The continued suitability of current law is questioned and a search is
made for a new and modern form of water law. Older systems
of self-generating rights-"private waters" and riparian rights
-are to be discarded; "concessions" bring ugly memories of
exploitation; and "prior appropriation" to many means some
sort of Wild West rip-off of the public domain. In the search
for a new system something called "administrative allocation
of water" is frequently advocated, although what is meant is
not always clear. In the course of a long career of teaching and
writing about water law, and of acting as a consultant to several states and developing countries, I have been exposed to
many variations on this theme. Most of them are prefaced by
a rejection of prior appropriation; it is made clear that this is
not what is wanted.
As a resident of the American West I have lived with prior
appropriation a long time. I used to think that prior appropriation was an American invention, and I have done my share of
repeating the familiar tale of how the '49ers protected their
gold claims and water ditches with Colt and Winchester, how
courts adopted these "customs" as American common law, and
how the farmers that came after them adapted the miners' law
to agriculture. But today I read in a compilation of the world's
water laws that the protection of vested rights and a preference
for the eldest rights is the most common of all systems of distribution of water, and many of these go back to antiquity and
can in no sense be said to be derived from American law.' Thus
it is natural to wonder why this prejudice against prior appropriation exists, why it is so often rejected by those who seek the
best. Since it is so widely used there must be some good to it.
As I look about and see the development that has taken place
in the western states and review their history of transition from
* B.A., L.L.B., University of Colorado; J.S.D., University of Wisconsin. The
author is Professor of Law at the University of Wyoming.
1. L. TEcLAFF, ABSTRACTION AND USE OF WATER: A COMPARISON OF LEGAL REGIMES
81, U.N. Doc. No. ST/ECA/154 (1972).
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gold rush to irrigated agriculture to great modern centers of
commerce, I cannot help but think that we must have done
something right.
What, then, are the objections to the spread of this common and proven system? Generally, they fall into two classes.
The first type is founded on observed facts. Sometimes an example of waste is cited: excessive water use in Idaho or duplicating ditches in California. Sometimes dry streambeds in
Arizona are pointed to as proving that instream uses, ecological
balances, and environmental values cannot be protected under
prior appropriation. The mistake in these cases is the assumption that because these examples of defects can be found the
defects are inherent in the system. Most of these distortions
and dislocations seem historical remnants of a pioneer system
that need not be repeated today or minor aberrations that
could be corrected by small adjustment of the system or tighter
administration of the law.
The second class of objections is based on theory. Three
recurrent reactions are voiced:
1. A dislike of the "property system"; appropriators seize
valuable interests in the public domain and enrich themselves
at the expense of the public.
2. A mistrust of the "market system"; a fear that under
prior appropriation, water rights will become "frozen in the
pioneer patterns," unsuitable for modern times and problems,
and not subject to reallocation to new uses and needs.
3. A dislike of the "priority system"; in a shortage an
"all-or-nothing" rule gives one of two essentially similarly situated water users all of his water while his neighbor gets none.
To a large extent these objections are based on lack of
understanding-a failure to appreciate the flexibility and variety of operational methods available under controlled appropriation laws.
I. CONTROL OF INITIATION OF USES
Those who object to prior appropriation as a crude pioneer
system are simply not up with the times. In the early days of
western prior appropriation the pioneers did help themselves to
water as they would "take berries from a bush or a rabbit from
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the plain."' The water was given away, but then so was the
land. Even so the pioneer was hard put to survive, and as he
broke the land to the plow and dug his ditches his "sweat
equity" generally dispelled the charge of unearned increment.
Today the water might be sold, but tradition is against it, and
most governments are still willing to let water increase the
wealth of their citizens rather than have it increase the balance
in the state coffers.
The states did place some demands on the water users.
The earliest limit on the appropriation of water was the legal
concept of "beneficial use." Most of the pioneer uses met this
test: water was used to mine the gold and silver from the hills,
to dispell the myth of the "Great American Desert" by irrigated agriculture, to provide water for cities, railroads, and all
forms of industry. By 1890 the need for more controls was seen
by the people of Wyoming, who adopted the first permit system. A person who desires water must apply to a state official,
who may deny the permit if there is no unappropriated water
in the source or if the proposed appropriation will be contrary
to the public interest. This statute became the model for most
of the West, and today fifteen states have similar laws.3 In 1910
the New Mexico court first gave the public interest concept
some real content. The court was faced with two conflicting
applications for the same water, and the first applicant to file
demanded that he receive the permit. The court, however, said
that the purpose of the statute was to secure the greatest possible benefit from the public waters for the public, and told the
state water authorities to choose the better of the two projects,
not merely the first proposal.4 This is the legal expression of
what the economist calls the efficiency principle, the notion
that we should get the maximum net benefits from the use of
our resources.
The power to control the initiation of water uses was seldom exercised, and few conflicts over unappropriated water
occurred. Most beneficial uses were also found to be in the
2. Lasky, From Prior Appropriationto Economic Distribution of Water by the
State Via IrrigationAdministration, 1 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 161 (1929).
3. Alaska, Arizona, California, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
4. Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 15 N.M. 666, 110 P. 1045 (1910).
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public interest, and although private initiative could be theoretically controlled by permits, in practice few were denied.
However, there were some examples. An Oregon appropriation
was denied when it was found that it could interfere with the
state's plan for development of its lands and waters.5 A limitation was placed on the height of a Wyoming dam to preserve
the canyon for a future railroad link between two areas of the
state. In Utah the Bureau of Reclamation and the state government were cooperating on a plan for a large multipurpose
project that would bring irrigation, municipal, and electric
power benefits to three counties. An entrepreneur filed an application for a smaller project that would have seriously interfered with this development. Although he had filed first, the
state authorities, backed by the courts, subordinated the small
project to the large multipurpose project.7
These cases laid the groundwork for modern water planning. Today in many states an inventory has been taken of
water resources and the alternative possibilities for their use.
The goals of the state are carefully spelled out, policies are
adopted to bring them to fruition, and the permit process is the
mechanism for effectuating the plan. Strong efforts are being
made in this direction in Wyoming, Alaska, the West Coast
States, and others. A proposed private use that does not accord
with the state plan will be denied, or brought into line by
conditions attached to its permit. This technique is spreading
eastward; the permit feature of western prior appropriation law
is the one which has been most accepted in the Eastern
States. Several of them, including Florida, Kentucky, Delaware, Mississippi, and New Jersey, now have very similar planning and permit processes.
II. THE DURATION OF THE WATER RIGHT
The major objective of any water law must be to achieve,
or at least promote, the efficient allocation of water resources.
Economic efficiency is the reference: that combination of labor,
capital, and resources which will produce the greatest net benefits. Social and environmental factors will be worked into the
adjustment of costs and benefits. State plans, programs, and
5. Cookinham v. Lewis, 58 Ore. 484, 114 P. 88 (1911).
6. Big Horn Power Co. v. State, 23 Wyo. 271, 148 P. 1110 (1915).
7. Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943).
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policies may determine the optima to be sought, and state
projects and agencies may play a large part in reaching them.
Yet it is clear that in most countries a very large contribution
toward optimum use of water for irrigation and industry will
come from private sources. The water law system must foster
and encourage water use and provide a climate conducive to
investment in water-using enterprises. A person will put his
capital and labor into such an enterprise if he has sufficient
assurance that he will receive a fair return on his investment
for a period long enough to make the venture worthwhile. This
is the minimum the state must offer if it is to enlist the efforts
of the private sector. The use of water by people and firms can
be guided and controlled, but it cannot be forced. The state
may screen the uses and weed out the undesirable ones to insure that state policies and plans are furthered, and it may
impose conditions and limits to prevent undesirable practices
and side effects, but it must give security to investments and
opportunities for profit. With these assurances long term ventures and stable endeavors will be undertaken. Without them
much will be lost, for if risks are great only those requiring little
capital and promising quick returns will be taken, and cheap
construction and short cuts can be expected.
In a dynamic society efficiency also requires change, if
maximum benefits are to be continually obtained. New and
better uses will arise that promise more than is being produced
by existing, perhaps outmoded, uses. Demands will increase as
population and industrialization expand, and if they can not
be economically satisfied from unused supplies, changes in use
must take place. The resulting shifts from present uses to new
uses must meet the same test applied to an original use. Each
must be another step towards maximization of the benefits
from the resource. The economist, using the "Pareto criterion,"
tells us that a change will reach or approach a new optimum if
it will make at least one person better off and if it makes no
person worse off. A change that merely shifts wealth from one
person to another does not increase economic welfare, and even
if a new use will create greater wealth, the criterion requires the
gainer to pay the loser. The person who is better off should
receive the net gain from the change, not someone else's wealth
as well.
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The problem for the lawyer, then, is to draft a law, a system of water rights, that will promote this goal of efficiency by
providing both security and flexibility of water rights. Some
people see these two desiderataas opposites, and if too much
of one is given, the other is thought to suffer. Yet they can be
reconciled, and water rights can be made both secure and flexible.
A prime element of security is the tenure of the right. Prior
appropriation rights are held "in perpetuity," although in view
of the possibilities of loss through forfeiture or condemnation
they might better be described as "of indefinite duration." The
ideal water right should last as long as it is contemplated that
the water use will last. Rights for cities, irrigation, and other
purposes of a continuing nature should last indefinitely; there
is no substantial reason to think that a need will arise in 10 or
50 years to take water from the inhabitants of a city and give
it over to another use. If irrigation water furnishes a major
component of the value of land, the titles to the land and the
water should run concurrently. On the other hand, there is
little utility in leaving a mining company with a water right
after the mine has been exhausted.
Rights that last as long as the enterprise will give security
of tenure to the water user. But how are flexibility and change
to be accommodated if rights are perpetual or for long terms?
As an analogy, consider the laws applied to another valuable
resource: land. The state has exactly the same interests in
seeing that the highest and best use of land is made and that
those uses can change when needs change. Almost universally
rights to land are as secure a form of property as there is, and
land titles run "to him and his heirs forever." Yet land use is
flexible, and a shift from a low productive use to a higher
productive use is accomplished by the simple process of a sale
of the land. A farm on the outskirts of a city may have a higher
productive use as an industrial site or as a residential area. In
either case the industrialist or the developer can afford to pay
the farmer more than the land is worth as a farm, and the one
with the best use can afford the most. Both buyer and seller
profit. In this respect water resources are not too different from
land resources.
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This is not to say that unrestricted powers of sale are recommended. Legal mechanisms can be found that will permit
economic forces to operate within a framework of government
control. The government will generally favor a change in use
that moves water to higher productivity. The government may
disapprove of a change, however, and should be able to block
a transfer of the water right that would interfere with the rights
of third persons, result in a disfavored water use, or harm the
public interest. Procedures that permit affected private persons to raise objections and the government to approve or disapprove can take the form of government confirmation of a sale
or of cancelling the old right and issuing a new permit for the
new use. On the other hand, the government may wish to force
transfers that advance the public interest when private action
does not produce the desired change. Again, consider the case
of land. If the government needs the land, it takes it by expropriation or condemnation; if a favored enterprise needs it, the
government gives those powers to it. Fair compensation is paid
if the total value is taken and should similarly be paid if the
value given by water is taken.
The desirability of this mechanism for change is not seen
by all water lawyers. In fact, it seems quite popular nowadays
to recommend that water rights should last only for fixed, fairly
short periods." The advantage is thought to be the attainment
of flexibility, since at the end of the term the state has the
power to reassign the water to new and better uses. There are
disadvantages, however, to such a system, some of which accrue to the state in departures from optimum use and some of
which impose unnecessary harm upon the water user. Most
investments take many years to amortize, and the term must
be a long one if capital is to be attracted. Repairs and replacements may be foregone by the water user towards the end of a
fixed period. Flexibility is surrendered during the life of the
right, and if an application for a new use does not coincide with
the expiration of an old permit, the new user may have to wait
a fairly long time before water becomes available. If to meet
this the right is subject to condemnation or expropriation during its life, the usual compensation offered is the unamortized
8. F. MALONEY, R. AUSNESS & J. Mosms, A MODEL WATER CODE (1972).
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portion of the investment. But the holder of the right will in
many cases lose an asset more valuable than his sunk costs,
that is, the going concern value of his enterprise-the continuing opportunity to make a profit-which is presumably a contribution to the economy.
It may be wise to remember that we are speaking of laws
that affect people and that laws should be tested by thinking
through their application to practical facts. The theoretical
proposition is that water use should be flexible and that water
should move from less productive to higher and better uses.
The fact is that almost everywhere in the world irrigation of
agricultural crops produces less wealth per unit of water than
does almost any other use-hydroelectric power, food processing, raw material processing, mining, manufacturing, and
domestic and commercial consumption within municipalities.
So in practical operation a change to greater beneficial use will
mean that water now used by farmers will be shifted to large
enterprises or cities. There is nothing bad about this per se, in
fact it is almost inevitable. However, it may need to be controlled. For example, in a country where food production has a
high government priority the natural economic processes may
have to be interrupted and such changes forbidden. This would
force cities and industries to seek higher cost water not presently in use, and they might have to construct reservoirs or
bring water long distances from places where use has not yet
equalled supply.
But if these considerations do not apply and the change is
desired, a change made by fiat, without payment or compensation, will impoverish the farmer and unnecessarily enrich the
industrialist or city dweller. Inevitably the farmer is poorer
than he was before; he can produce less on his dry land. The
water he formerly used is now being used by a manufacturing
or mining company, for which the water cost would be a small
part of total operating costs and could be recouped in the price
for the product. If the water has moved to municipal uses, it is
now benefitting householders and owners of commercial establishments within the city, and the principle of requiring those
who receive the benefits to pay for them can be realized by a
simple adjustment of water rates. A very small addition to the
water bill of everyone in the city would create a fund from
which the payment could be made.
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III.

DISTRIBUTION IN TIMES OF SHORTAGE

Legal security given by tenure is only one-half the picture.
So far it has been assumed that water was available to fulfill
the right. But what if there is not enough to satisfy all rights?
What physical security does the law provide-what guarantees that the holder of a right will get water? When there is a
shortage of water, which water users get it? These questions
go to the heart of the law. Indeed, shortages are what the law
of water rights is all about. There is little need for water rights
if there is plenty of water for all.
The word "shortage" needs to be defined. It is meaningless
unless demand is considered as well as supply. On a variable
stream there may be an annual shortage if the normal or average low flows cannot support existing uses, although much high
water flows to the sea. There may be shortages induced by
drought if a usually sufficient supply fails in some years. There
may be a shortage although the stream is running full, if the
full flow is needed for fisheries, navigation, or environmental
concerns. There may be no shortage even though every drop is
used if the stream is so controlled that annual and perennial
flows are equated by storage and the smoothed-out supply is
fully, but not excessively, allocated. Such a firm right to a firm
supply puts the water user in the best of all worlds.
But for the most part the real world is not so ideal. Some
aquifers with steady recharge may present an opportunity to
limit water rights and match demand to supply, but most
streams are subject to very large annual fluctuations and to
marked variation in yearly total flows. Some are sufficiently
predictable to allow a dependable flow to be determined and

split among a fixed group of water users, but this either wastes
the excess high water if no rights are given to it or casts most
of the burden of shortage on the users of high water.
In all cases, however, the physically available supply

limits the water that can be withdrawn, and the state, if it is
to avoid chaos, must limit the claims to it. Inevitably, this
limit will have an element of temporal priority to it. When
claims equal supply, no more can be granted. New demands for
better uses must then be accommodated by some mechanism

for flexibility, as discussed above. Such a limit can be easily
fixed if the supply is fixed. When the source fluctuates and
sometimes can fill all needs but sometimes can not, some
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method of allocating or distributing the immediately available
water must be devised.
There are at least five ways of doing this. One is to enforce
strict temporal priority, as exemplified by American prior appropriation. Another is to apply equal sharing enforced by proportionate reduction, as among some riparian irrigators. A
third is to follow a statutory list of preferences, giving priority
according to a fixed ranking of the values of different uses. A
fourth is to distribute the water as determined by administrative discretion based on various economic and social factors. A
fifth is to put up the water for sale or auction, as practiced in
some Moslem communities.
Since the criterion for the law is efficiency in obtaining
maximum net benefits from water use, each of these must be
evaluated against that standard before an intelligent choice
can be made. Prima facie, each seems to have advantages and
disadvantages. Temporal priority gives security, but it may
sometimes seem to discriminate rather arbitrarily among people who are essentially similarly situated, and the earliest uses
may not be the best ones. Sharing may be equitable among
many farmers, but not if some have orchards or vineyards and
others grow annual field crops; and a variable supply may be
completely unsatisfactory for a factory or mine. Statutory lists
may reflect prevailing notions of relative values, but they may
embody obvious diseconomies or prevent the comparison of the
relative merits of individual uses. Even if they do prefer the
most efficient uses, they operate so that the rich get richer and
the poor get poorer. Bidding on the water market would seem
to insure that the water goes to those who can produce the most
from it, but it can lead to speculation and gouging, and to
enrichment of those who hold a monopoly on water rather than
those who work with it.
This leaves administrative control, and a number of water
lawyers have thought this to be the ideal. Their theory is to
place all the water in the hands of a wise administrator; let him
put it where it will do the most good, let him prorate, let him
reduce the supply or suspend the rights of some so that others
may receive the water.' I have serious reservations about this.
9. Id.; Clark, Guidelines for the Drafting of Water Codes, U.N. Water Resources
Ser. No. 43 (1973).
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We seldom give to a government official so much power over
the lives and livelihood of people. This procedure may deter
investment and development, since entrepreneurs hesitate to
engage in enterprises when success or failure depends upon
factors beyond their control. A rather ugly thought occurs the human factor could be subjected to enormous temptations
and tremendous pressures to play political favorites, yield to
political coercion, and offer and receive bribes and graft. Even
the most scrupulously honest administrators have complained
of the personal strain such decisions cause, and have disclaimed the wisdom to make them with any assurance. And
even if wisdom can be found, it must not only exist in higher
echelons where policy is decided, but it must also be spread
through all the regional subordinates and field men who must
make the actual on-the-spot decisions in individual cases.
Those who advocate administrative distribution in case of
shortage may urge that with this method the public interest,
or the environment, can be protected. But it must be remembered that all of this has been taken care of in the initial allocation of rights. To understand the workings of administrative
distribution, it must be very clearly kept in mind that all we
are talking about is water already allocated to private use, that
the state and its administrators have issued permits for its use,
that every use is beneficial, and that all the uses can be made
in times of water plenty. It must be remembered that all minimum flow requirements are met, that all other environmental
factors are protected, and that the state water plan is observed
or even furthered. The public interest stands neutral, and the
only question is: Which people get to use the water?
If each system has its good and bad features, must we then
choose the least of evils? I think not. It is possible to combine
the best features of all of these and to eliminate the bad effects
of each.
In the preferred solution, temporal priority is the starting
point, but only that. It does give security; it does mean that
the state, having granted water to A, will not later grant that
same water to B. Temporal priority is not the grant of a special
privilege. It is simply a necessary element of the description of
the water right that marks its boundaries and distinguishes it
from other rights. On a fluctuating source, it is the only way
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that new rights can be limited to water that is available in
nature and is not already committed to existing uses. These
virtues can be combined with those of sharing, if that is desirable. This is frequently done all over the world, even in western
America, where a project or distribution scheme serves a number of irrigators who share the distributor's appropriated water
right. If that right cannot be supplied in full, the consumers
take a proportionate reduction. Much the same thing can be
done even though no works are needed and it is contemplated
that individuals will provide their own means of diversion. If a
reasonably dependable supply is available and total withdrawals are held to that limit, all of the permits, although requested
at different times, could be given the same priority date or
number. The plan would replace the project; the plan would
receive the priority. This would avoid overcrowding by too
many seeking shares and would settle the relationships between the irrigators as a group and other irrigators, industrial
users, and municipalities.
Next is the problem of seeing that the water goes to the
best uses. If the more productive and valuable users have junior
water rights, economic efficiency can still be served by using
the market, under the supervision of the administrator. We
have spoken of transfers of water rights, but there is also need
for sales of water as a commodity. The State of New Mexico
gives a good example of how this can work. A statute permits
the "leasing of the use of water" by an appropriator to any
other person, with the approval of the state authorities. 0 In a
water-short year, growers of beans who anticipate a high price
may hold junior water rights that give them no supply, while
potato growers who face a glutted market can draw water under
their senior rights. The bean growers buy water from the potato
farmers. Maximum efficiency is reached, since the high-value
crop is produced, and both water users share the profits. An
administrator could not do as well. If he were charged with
distributing the water on the basis of economic efficiency, he
would allocate the water to the bean grower, but that lucky
farmer would get all his profit while the unfortunate potato
grower would suffer a total loss. If the administrator attempted
10. N.M. Coup. LAWS, §§ 75-40-1 to -7 (1953).
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to avoid this by a criterion of equity and gave half the water to
each, the highest and best use would not be served and maximum production would not be reached.
Another example of how temporary transfers of rights or
sales of water could be of great utility is that of the city which
gambled on a junior water right and is faced with an unusual
drought. If farmers hold the priority, I would assume that an
administrator would say that the city has the better use and
would cut off the farmers' supply. The city would get the water,
but the farmer would be bankrupted. This is a social cost which
must be reckoned, and the best way to account for it is to have
the city pay for the farmers' lost crop. A country enacting a new
law could improve on the New Mexico system by allowing only
owners of permits to make purchases and by limiting quantities
to enough to make up the shortage in the permitted supply.
This would avoid the use of water by unauthorized persons or
in unauthorized quantities. The administrator could also be
given the power to force such temporary transfers and empower
preferred users who are unable to make private arrangements
to take temporary control of water rights at a fair compensation.
Up to now we have been dealing with shortages as if they
were inevitable and uncontrollable. Both annual low flows and
cyclic drought produce periods of plenty and periods of shortage, but in many areas storage of water can be used to equate
the flow, to save high water for use in the low water period.
Where storage is physically and economically available, the
rule for dividing shortage is in practical fact a rule for determining who pays for the dam and reservoir. If an open-ended
system of riparian sharing of a variable stream for irrigation
eventually were to lead to too many and too small shares, all
holders of rights might band together in some joint or communal organization to raise the dam. I think, however, that the
costs of dislocation and the difficulties of organization would
be great. If economic productivity is the criterion for determining who gets low flows, the burden of providing storage would
be cast on those least able to afford it. But if temporal priority
is the rule, the juniors who enter the field after the low water
is all spoken for must pay. Is this fair? I think so, for reasons
to be developed later. It certainly is desirable from the stand-
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point of securing the main goal, the efficient use of water. The
persons who will get the direct benefit of the storage must
consider whether it is worth the price. A large estate-a communal group of farmers, an industry, a city, or a government
multipurpose agency-which wants the water must calculate
whether its benefits will exceed its costs.
From the standpoint of equity and justice it should be
remembered that development takes place over time. The first
users take cheap, easily available, always available water.
There is no shortage. When more and more uses are made,
shortages are created as demands increase to meet or exceed
low flow supply. Additional risks are created and additional
costs must be met. It seems not unfair for the government to
place those risks and those costs on those who create them.
Justice is difficult to identify. One American writer has
said that injustice is easier to spot, that human beings hold in
common many notions of when they are being abused or
treated unfairly." One of those notions is that when a person
has taken, used, become accustomed to, and made a livelihood
from water, it becomes "his water," and that one who takes it
from him has "stolen his water." I used to think that prior
appropriation was an American invention, but now I am convinced it was simply the verbal identification of a very widespread human trait.
Teclaff, in his survey of 57 countries, tells us that seniority
in use is the most common of all bases for distributing water
among users." In its most explicit form, prior appropriation
exists not only in 19 American states, but also in four western
provinces of Canada, Taiwan, China, Iran, Rhodesia, Zambia,
and the Philippines. There are strong elements of it in several
South American countries. 3 The 1963 British Water Resources
Act creates a "protected right" indistinguishable from an appropriation, though enforced in an unusual roundabout manner."
Protection based on temporal priority is to some degree
implicit in many other laws. Before state controls came into
11. E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE: AN ANTHROPORENTIC VIEW OF LAW (1949).

12. L. TECLAFF, supra note 1.
13. L. TECLAFF, supra note 1, at 82-83.
14. Water Resources Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (1970).
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being, customary water rights, held from time immemorial or
for prescriptive periods, were everywhere protected. When
state authority to use water was instituted, the notion that a
state should not make successive grants of the same water to
different people appeared in most such laws. Permits, licenses,
or concessions-whatever they may be called-are not to be
issued to the detriment of existing uses in most of the Spanish
American countries, in several of the eastern United States, in
Tanzania, and in Italy. Practically every new water code has
given some sort of group preference to uses in existence when
the code was adopted.
Some evidence indicates a subliminal recognition of priority even where the law is specifically to the contrary. The natural flow theory of 19th century English riparianism has been
said to have been a protection of mill owners, a law designed
to keep the wheels of the Industrial Revolution turning. 5 The
reasonable use theory of American riparian law is applied to
require several types of adjustments which enable several riparian uses to coexist, but a recent study of the cases shows
that when two uses are truly incompatible the American courts
almost invariably hold that a new use is unreasonable if it takes
the water supply of an existing user."6 Empirical studies show
the existence of a sort of "practical priority" in some American
states, where riparians with theoretical rights to share in a
stream voluntarily refrain from taking water after their neighbors have first captured the available supply. Even under modern statutes that subject the allocation and distribution of
water to administrative discretion, the administrators in Great
Britain, Kenya, and Mexico have eased their burden by issuing
permits that authorize the withdrawal of water only when there
is a surplus over the needs of existing users.

IV.

EXAMPLES

I realize that, when I state my personal precepts for a
desirable form of water rights, I take issue with a number of
colleagues. In many personal conversations and exchanges of
correspondence we have debated the merits of long term versus
15. Beuscher, Appropriation Water Law Elements in RiparianDoctrineStates, 10
BUFFALO L. REV. 448 (1961).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 850B(h)(i), Notes at 115-18 (Tent. Draft
No. 17, 1971).
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short term water rights, voluntary transfers versus governmental shifts of water use, and priority versus administrative distribution of shortages. I seldom lose these debates, of course, but
I seldom seem to win them either. Too often our arguments do
not meet head on because my propositions seem hard to state
and the full implications of prior appropriation seem difficult
to understand, and my opponents assume that I advocate some
kind of "robber baron" speculation in the national patrimony.
It is not difficult to show that administrative control offers
advantages over such a system. It seems very difficult to explain how a system of controlled rights-secure but transferable and limited to quantities available in the source and not
previously committed to other uses-can incorporate each advantage claimed for discretionary administration.
Perhaps the propositions here set forth can be clarified by
illustration. Two very new examples may be compared: one
represents the ultimate in discretionary control of water use by
officials, the other is based on the principles I have recommended.
Last year the President of the Philippines created a new
National Water Resources Council and empowered it to issue
rules and regulations for the exploitation and optimum utilization of water resources. 7 The superseded Irrigation Law of 1912
was modeled on an early form of American prior appropriation,
implemented by a permit system. A number of contributing
factors had made administration of the law ineffective, and
permit procedures were overwhelmed by a flood of applications
resulting from a new government program. The Council
quickly adopted interim rules designed to expedite the processing of applications for water rights, and those rules make a
fundamental departure from the nature of existing rights. The
permits under the rules will not definitely fix the quantity of
water allowed, the priority of the right, or the duration of the
right. Each will be subject to these conditions:
The Council may, after due notice and hearing, reduce at any
time the quantity of water or adopt a system of apportionment,
distribution or rotation thereof when the facts and circumstances
17. See Trelease, Current Developments in Philippine Water Law-Suggested
Interim Groundwater Regulation (1975) (prepared for MIA-UNDP/FAO Ground-water
Development Project).
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in any situation would warrant the same in the interests of legal
appropriators.
The Council may, after due notice and hearing, revoke the permit
in favor of projects for greater beneficial use or for a multipurpose
use."

As explained by the Council's staff, these conditions were
written into the permit for five reasons:
1. Wasteful uses: Some water users are wasteful, some
can get along with less water, and, as water demand increases
and technology progresses, all water users may be required to
initiate more economical methods or facilities.
2. Reduction of use: Irrigated lands are frequently subjected to changes in land use. If a water right exists to serve
an area of land and part of the land is sold for residential use,
or if the water is concentrated on one part while another is more
or less permanently devoted to a purpose such as storage or a
barnyard, the right should be reduced in quantity or terminated in part.
3. Sharing during drought: In time of drought, it is inequitable that the entire burden of shortage fall on some
farmers, while others, essentially similarly situated, get a full
supply. "We wish to abolish priority" was the statement
made.
4. Incorporationinto projects: It is expected that many
small irrigated plots will later be served by large multipurpose
projects.
5. Flexibility of use: To "keep up with progress" under
developing conditions and to permit "greater beneficial use" it
will be necessary to shift water from one enterprise to new and
different ones that will contribute more to the Philippine economy and development, and to permit multipurpose uses of
greater public benefit.
Each of these reasons has a sound basis in fact, and each
problem or need described exists. Each condition described can
be corrected and each aim accomplished by administrative action under the terms of the permit. These conditions will protect the paramount interests of the state, preserve every right
18. Philippine National Water Resources Council, Interim Rules Governing Application for Water Permit, Dec. 17, 1974.
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of the state, and subordinate private uses of water to state
control at every stage.
Contrast the new water law recommended for Swaziland. 19
The Swaziland permit is a "protected right," following British
terminology, and each permit bears the date on which the application therefor was filed. The law provides:
Every water right shall be protected from derogation by the exercise of any permit bearing a later date and shall entitle the holder
to abstract the whole amount of water specified in the permit
before any water is distributed to the holder of a permit bearing
a later date.

The permit lasts as long as water is needed:
Every permit shall state the period of its duration, as determined
by the Board in accordance with the following provisions: (a) any
permit for [domestic] use, for urban and public water supply,
for the irrigation of land and for other purposes of a continuing
nature shall be of indefinite duration, and valid until revoked,
varied or cancelled in accordance with § 23 [with compensation
except in cases of three year nonuse or violation of law]; (b) any
permit for industrial purposes shall lapse with the termination of
the use of the water for such purposes or with the. abandonment
of the mine, plant or other facility for which it was used.

These provisions give the Swaziland water user the security denied to his Philippine counterpart. Yet every objective
of the Philippine Government can be accomplished under the
Swazi law. In Swaziland, as in the Philippines, physical waste
can be found. Irrigators use large quantities of water, inefficient means of diversion, and wasteful practices. Cheap water
is used instead of expensive equipment or labor. But a Swazi
permit will be issued subject to:
Such terms, conditions, restrictions and limitations as [the
Board] deems necessary for the protection of others and the public interest including (a) any limitation whereby the quantity of
water permitted to be extracted is restricted to that amount
which may be beneficially and economically used and efficiently
applied.

If future conditions require the state to impose an increase
in efficiency, the permit is also subject to:
Any requirement for the abstraction and use of the quantity al19. Trelease, A Proposed National Water Resources Order for Swaziland, U.N.
Doc. No. OTC/SWA/73/002 (1975).
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lowed by the permit to be made pursuant to the regulations or
orders of the Board governing efficient water management.

These same conditions in the permit could be used to take
care of the second case that bothers the Philippine Council, in
which the amount of irrigated land is decreased and less water
is therefore needed. Since the beneficial use is decreased the
amount of water needed for the remainder of the land would
decrease. Further, the Swazi law states that:
The Board may cancel or vary any permit if the holder thereof
voluntarily fails or neglects, without sufficient cause, to apply all
or any part of the water to the use for which the permit was issued
for a period of three successive years.

Thus, if the decrease in use were temporary, the decrease
in water delivery would be temporary, but, if the decrease were
permanent, a part of the water right would cease to exist.
In the third situation, the Philippine Council reserves the
right to apportion and rotate a short supply among irrigators.
The practical problem arises from the fact that the government, seeking to improve rice yields by prolonging the growing
season with irrigation, has distributed a large number of pumps
to individual farmers in order to enable them to use whatever
water is available. Each farmer will have to apply for a permit,
and it is felt that minor differences in the time of filing should
not be the deciding factor in determining who gets the water.
In Swaziland as well, projects are being studied that call for
irrigation of small plots of new land by the Swazi people. On
some of them the water is quite accessible and may be taken
by individual works that may be initiated at different times;
on others the government will construct large works and deliver
the water to the farmers. In either type of settlement, equality
and sharing among the irrigators is thought desirable. The law
therefore states:
If a government irrigation project or scheme or an irrigation project or scheme initiated by an organization or group of water users
is to be effectuated by permits issued to individual water users,
the government, industry, department or agency, or the organization or group, may apply to the Board for an order setting aside
or reserving a specified quantity of water for the irrigation of all
irrigable lands to be served by the project or scheme, and the
Board may issue such order and thereafter all permits issued for
the irrigation of such land shall bear the date of the application
for such order.
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All permits bearing the same date shall entitle the holders thereof
to a prorata share of the source of water insufficient to supply all
such rights in full.

The fourth concern of the Philippine Council is that of the
small farm which is swallowed up by a large project. It is contemplated that the land will continue to be irrigated, and what
is actually involved is the substitution of the project's right for
the old individual right. This would be done without compensation. The farmer's facilities would be rendered useless, however, and he would bear a double burden if he must pay for his
own works and a full share of project costs as well. Contrast the
Swazi solution:
If as a result of variation or revocation the holder of the varied
or revoked permit can be supplied with water by a government
or private scheme or project, or a local authority, in favor of
which the permit was revoked or varied, damages shall be limited
to the unamortized portion of the investment in water works
rendered useless or unnecessary.

Lastly, the Philippine permit was made revocable at the
will of the Council so that it might keep up with progress and
shift water to new enterprises that will contribute more to the
country's development, or to government multipurpose projects. Such opportunities for water to move to higher and better
uses will occur in Swaziland as well. If a new government
scheme is planned, and it is found that an incompatible existing use must be ended or that the water must be acquired for
the project, then:
If the [government], a local authority, the Electricity Board, or
any ministry, department or agency of the government constructing or operating a government scheme, project or water work,
desires to acquire for its purposes any existing water right, servitude or land, it may. . . acquire such water rights, servitude or
land, or such portion thereof as may be necessary, by expropriation and the Acquisition of Property Act shall ... apply to such
expropriation and the compensation ... to be paid therefor.

Swaziland has large reserves of coal and is highly mineralized, and if a mining enterprise should in the future need a firm
supply of water it could approach any one of a number of farmers who have high priority water rights and work out a transfer:
The Board may authorize the use of all or part of the water to be
abstracted pursuant to permit to be changed or transferred to a
different use or place of use by the same or another person if a
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change or transfer is effected by a surrender of the permit and the
issuance of a new permit or permits bearing the same date.
In proceedings for obtaining approval of the Board for any change
or transfer, . . . the Board shall approve and allow changes and
transfers . . . only if it is satisfied that no injury will occur to the
water rights of other persons, that the new use or place of use will
be in the public interest and in conformity to or compatible with
a water resources plan relating to the source or area, provided,
that in appropriate cases the Board may inquire into the adequacy of the consideration paid to the person making the transfer
and as to whether permitting the transfer will be to the best
interests of such person.

The transaction would be the same as if the mining company needed the farmer's land. Since the company will in fact
produce greater wealth than does the farmer, it will be able to
afford to buy out the farmer's interest to give him a substitute
in money that will replace the foregone income from farming.
The state will control the transaction, protect its interest, and
must agree that its goals and plans are furthered by the shift.
The last proviso illustrates state retention of control over a
social factor. If the transferor is a Swazi farmer, the transaction
can be scrutinized to see that he was not overreached in the
bargaining process and that he has other opportunities he can
grasp, and has not merely sold his birthright for a mess of
pottage.
To summarize, in both countries and under either form of
law waste can be prevented, forfeiture imposed for nonuse,
shortages prorated among similarly situated irrigators, large
projects substituted for individual works, and water moved to
higher and better uses. Under the interim rules of the Philippines this is accomplished by telling the water user that the
initial quantity of water allotted to him may be reduced at any
time for someone else's benefit, and that his entire water right
may be taken from him at any time the government or someone
else needs it. This is overkill-more than is necessary for the
purpose. Though these same objectives are reached in Swaziland, there the water user, whether African farmer or mining
executive, knows he will be allowed the quantity needed for
efficient accomplishment of his use. He knows whether or not
he must share and, if he must, with how many. He knows that
if he needs a firm supply and the source is variable, he must
arrange for storage. He knows that, if the government takes
back its grant of water, it will compensate him for the loss.
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The Philippine Water Council and its staff are men of good
will, public servants seeking to advance the best interests of the
government and to wring the last benefit from water use. But
since the intent is to accomplish much of the development of
the Philippines through the private sector-by individuals,
cooperatives, and businesses engaged in food production and
processing, raw material extraction and processing,
manufacturing, and mining-the question may be asked
whether such tenuous rights may not frighten away such water
users and actually prove counterproductive in achieving the
government's objective. When the present crisis is over the
interim regulations are to be replaced with a permanent water
code. At that point, the Philippine government might well consider whether its interests may be better served and more benefits obtained by giving greater assurance to those whose energies must be enlisted in the effort to develop the nation's water
resources.
V.

CONCLUSION

I might close with an anecdote. On a mission to Jamaica
for the Food and Agriculture Organization I recommended provisions similar to those suggested for Swaziland. 2 My charge
in the assignment to Jamaica was to draft a law which would
give aid and encouragement to the developing Jamaican
economy-based largely on irrigated sugar cane with a more
recent overlay of tourism, mining, and manufacturing-and to
protect the island's cities and tropical environment. In submitting various drafts I encountered some resistance to American
language and quietly shifted from "prior appropriation" to the
British "protected right," with which the Jamaicans felt more
comfortable. During the process a counterproposal was made
for an "administrative system" of permits covering the
"expected constant yield," and for the rationing of water in
times of shortage based on "the value of the particular uses"
and "the national interest." The supposed simplicity of this,
compared to my allegedly complicated recommendations, had
a certain appeal, but eventually my proposal won out. It has
since received cabinet approval, although it has not yet been
adopted by the Parliament.
20. Trelease, A Proposed Water Resources Act for Jamaica, FAO Doc. No.
AGL:SF/JAM/12 (1973).
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During the discussion, the Jamaican codirector of the project probed into how operations would actually be conducted.
He was quick to see the type of pressures that could be brought
and the difficult decisions that would have to be made in determining the size of the "expected constant yield" and whether
one more permit could be squeezed into it. He also saw the ease
with which he could issue permits that prohibited interference
with previously issued protected rights. And he was enchanted
with the notion of handling shortages by priority coupled with
temporary transfers of water, as in New Mexico.
"I see-under the other system I might have to choose
between shutting down a new hotel or starving some cane farmers. But one or two farmers' quota would supply the hotel, and
under your law I could just notify the hotel manager to start
negotiations. Why, I might even act as broker and help them
get together."
I believe that man caught a glimpse of what water law is
all about.

